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Abstract
In philosophy of language, the phenomena fundamental to human
communication are routinely modeled in ways that do not require commit-
ment to a concept of “information” separate from those of “data,” “mean-
ing,” “communication,” “knowledge,” and “relevance” (inter alia). A tax-
onomy of conceptions of information may be developed that relies on
commonly drawn philosophical distinctions (between linguistic, mental,
and physical entities, between objects and events, and between particulars
and universals); in such a taxonomy, no category requires the label “infor-
mation” in order to be differentiated from others. It is suggested that a
conception of information-as-relevance is currently the most productive of
advances in theoretical information studies.
Unsurprisingly, the nature of information has long been a topic of central
concern for scholars of information studies (IS).1  The body of literature
in which authors have attempted to provide answers to the question “What
is information?” may be viewed in any (or any combination) of the follow-
ing ways: (i) as contributing to science—if information is cast as a naturally
occurring phenomenon; (ii) as contributing to social science—if information
is considered to be a product of human artiﬁce; or (iii) as contributing to
philosophy—if “information” is treated primarily as a fundamental concept
existing at the same level as, for example, meaning, knowledge, and truth.
Although this body of literature is sizeable when taken as a whole, the
quantity of work that may be classed under the third heading is small. One
approach that is often taken in studies representative of the third class is
to compare theories of information with theories of knowledge. Commonly,
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the everyday conception of knowledge (as the content of mental states) is
contrasted with a philosophical conception of knowledge (typically, as
justiﬁed true belief); and information is identiﬁed as knowledge (that is,
knowledge in the ﬁrst, everyday sense) that has been recorded or that is in
some sense objective, external, or public. Somewhat oddly, given the nature
of the conception of knowledge that is typically adopted in such accounts,
a tendency has been for authors to go on to use the results of this kind of
analysis to locate IS with respect to epistemology. A more productive approach
might instead be to relate work in IS to that in philosophy of language, since
it is the latter branch of philosophy that is concerned more exclusively with
the content of mental states (i.e., thoughts); with the ways in which such
content may be expressed, represented, or recorded; and with the ways in
which such expressions may be interpreted or their meaning understood.
My suggestion is that if this alternative direction is taken, we shall ﬁnd
that philosophers of language have modeled the phenomena fundamen-
tal to human communication in ways that do not require us to commit to a
separate concept of “information.” Indeed, we can conclude that such a
concept is unnecessary for IS. Once the concepts of interest have been la-
beled with conventional names such as “data,” “meaning,” “communica-
tion,” “relevance,” etc., nothing is left (so it may be argued) to which to apply
the term “information.” One corollary of such a conclusion is the equally
negative judgment that the ﬁeld of IS is itself misnamed, and that its sub-
ject matter should more appropriately be treated as a branch of communi-
cation studies, semiotics, or library studies.
In this paper, I will present a simple taxonomy of common conceptions
of information—a taxonomy in which no single category seems to unequiv-
ocally require the label “information” to differentiate it from others. Before
reaching that point, however, I wish to review some terminological distinc-
tions that are commonplace in the literature of philosophy of language and
that may correspond to certain distinctions that lie at the core of philoso-
phy of information. And I would like to begin by attending to two prelim-
inary questions that immediately present themselves when embarking on
any attempt to develop a philosophical theory of information or to distin-
guish between competing theories.
The Desirable Properties of a Philosophical Theory of
Information
First: What is the distinctive nature and scope of a philosophical theo-
ry of information (as distinguished from a theory of information of any
other kind)?
A philosophical theory of information—or, more precisely, a metaphys-
ical or ontological theory of information—is assumed here to be a speciﬁ-
cation of the necessary and sufﬁcient conditions under which a phenome-
non may be identiﬁed as “information.” Arriving at such a speciﬁcation
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involves conceptual analysis—that is, analysis of the meaning of the
concept(s) referred to by the word “information.” Conceptual analysis
emerged as the primary method used by philosophers in the particular
paradigm (“analytic” philosophy) that rose to dominance in anglophone
countries in the twentieth century. In our present case, the analysis also will
involve conceptual classiﬁcation, since it happens that several different
conceptions of information have risen to different levels of prominence,
and it is often helpful to construct a taxonomy highlighting the differences
perceived to be most important.
Our second preliminary question is, On what criteria may a philosoph-
ical theory of information be evaluated?
Given the parallel existence of multiple (and perhaps mutually exclu-
sive) conceptions of information, it would be helpful to choose from among
them on the basis of some agreed-upon criterion (or set of criteria). The
possibilities include the following:
1. Coherence. Our understanding of information should plausibly cohere
with our understanding of other related concepts such as knowledge,
meaning, truth, cognition, relevance, etc.
2. Parsimony. According to the principle of Occam’s razor, a theory should
not posit the existence of unfamiliar kinds of entities, unless it proves
impossible to account for certain phenomena in terms of primitive or
familiar concepts.
3. Utility. The primary purpose of a theory, one might argue, is to enhance
our understanding of the object of study. Understanding may be im-
proved by many means; one of the most productive is the process by
which we come to recognize the simultaneous validity of multiple per-
spectives on a single issue. If a theory is suggestive of an agenda for fu-
ture work, either through further theorizing or through empirical re-
search, then it is doing its job.
The Physical, the Mental, and the Linguistic
A simple model that one may use to show how some of the concerns
of modern philosophical inquiry relate to one another is depicted in Fig-
ure 1. In this model, entities of interest are divided among three catego-
ries: (i) physical entities, such as objects and situations; (ii) mental entities,
such as concepts and thoughts; and (iii) linguistic entities,2  such as words
and utterances.3  The nature of entities in the physical world is the concern
of metaphysics;4  the nature of entities in the mental world is the concern of
philosophy of mind; and the nature of entities in the linguistic world is the
concern of philosophy of language.
Where these separate areas of inquiry overlap is in their shared inter-
est in the nature of the relationships between entities in different catego-
ries. We might wish to say, for instance, that linguistic entities (e.g., utter-
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ances) both “express” mental entities (e.g., thoughts) and are “about” phys-
ical entities (e.g., situations). We might also wish to say that mental entities
are, in some similar sense, “about” physical entities. This simple rendering
of the triangular structure immediately raises questions that seem to require
more complex answers—answers upon which, ideally, there would be con-
sensus in multiple branches of philosophy.
For example, we might ask, What, more precisely, is the nature of the
linguistic (or semantic) aboutness that relates words and objects? Is this
linguistic aboutness different from the cognitive aboutness that relates
concepts and objects? If one of these kinds of relationship is to be charac-
terized as “meaning,” how is the other to be differentiated? Each of these
kinds of relationship has been the object of extended analysis; indeed, the
central project of the philosophy of language in the twentieth century may
be viewed as an extended exploration of the meaning of “meaning.” What
is it to say (i) that something has meaning (i.e., is meaningful) and (ii) that
something has the particular meaning p? A comprehensive review of the
contributions to the literature on these topics is well beyond the scope of
the present paper.5  Instead, what is provided here is a brief introduction
to some of the more basic issues, with the aim simply of reaching the point
where we may comprehensibly suggest deﬁnitions of the categories that, it
is argued, are most relevant to a philosophy of information.
expression
representation “presentation”
Linguistic Mental
Physical
•  wordsJ
•  utterancesJ
•  etc.
•  conceptsJ
•  thoughtsJ
•  etc.
(linguistic aboutness) (cognitive aboutness)•  objectsJ
•  situationsJ
•  etc.
Figure 1. Entities of interest to modern philosophical inquiry.
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Situations and Utterances
One way of beginning a review of some of the very early steps to be
made in any pursuit of a theory of meaning is to distinguish between phys-
ical situations and linguistic utterances.
A situation is a particular state of affairs in the physical world. At ﬁrst
sight, the phrase “state of affairs” may seem vague and obscure. The essence
of the idea is that a situation is composed of certain things, that it has a
structure of some kind. There are a number of different ways in which we
might wish to describe the composition of a situation. Our choice will de-
pend on our basic ontological views on the existence of certain fundamen-
tal categories of physical entities—categories such as objects, events, classes,
properties, and relations. On one account, we might say that a situation is
made up of a set of objects arranged in a certain way; which (some would
argue) is tantamount to saying that any situation may be considered (in
mathematical terms) as a graph made up of (i) a set of objects, together
with (ii) a set of object-pairs denoting the relationships among objects. On
this account, it is also common (but not necessary) to view each individual
object as a set of properties or attribute/value pairs.6  For example, we might
imagine a situation in which I am standing in front of my car. In this par-
ticular situation, two of the important objects are me and my car; these two
objects are arranged in a particular way (i.e., with me in front of my car
rather than behind it, in it, or jumping over it, etc.); and, to take just one
of the two objects in question, my car may be described as being small in
size, red in color, Japanese in origin, and so on.
An utterance (or expression) is a particular vehicle of meaning. “Mean-
ing,” of course, is a complex concept of central interest to us and requires
further analysis. In the meantime, we can be somewhat more speciﬁc and
suggest that an utterance is the product of a human decision to act by us-
ing words in a way that has meaning. An example of an utterance is the
particular string of words that I spoke at 6 p.m. yesterday: “I am standing
in front of my car.” At 6 p.m. yesterday, I decided to act in a way that would
have a particular meaning, and I acted on that decision by voicing a partic-
ular sequence of sounds. (Of course, not all utterances are spoken; many
are written. And although utterances may be said to occur at the moment
they are ﬁrst spoken or written, they can be—and often are—recorded for
future consideration.)
As well as being something that has meaning, an utterance is something
that happens, that takes place. In other words, an utterance is an event—
something that occurs on a particular occasion (or, we might say, over a
particular period). As an event, an utterance is datable, in the sense that we
may, in principle, determine its temporal properties; we may specify, for
instance, its time of commencement and/or of completion. Indeed, the
category of events is itself a plausible candidate for inclusion in any list of
fundamental categories of entities, and thus our categorization of utter-
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ances as events—in virtue of their physicality rather than their meaning or
semantic content—would commit us to identifying utterances themselves
as, potentially, components of situations.
We also need to bear in mind that an utterance is the product of a
human decision to act. Utterances occur because people make them. As a
human artifact, an utterance is authenticatable, in the sense that we may, in
principle, determine the identity of its author or speaker. We also may spec-
ulate as to the intentions of the speaker of an utterance when making the
decision to utter. We may ask: What was the goal of the speaker? What did
the speaker hope to achieve through uttering the set of words that were
uttered? Is it sensible to talk about differences between the meaning that
was intended and the meaning that was actually expressed?
Finally, we must be aware that, typically, at least one component of a
speaker’s set of intentions in making an utterance is to affect a hearer in
some speciﬁc way—to bring about a change of some kind in the hearer’s
mental state. With respect to any given utterance, we may thus additionally
ask, Is it sensible to talk about differences between the meaning that was
expressed by the speaker, and the meaning that was understood by the
hearer?
We now can return to what might be conceived as the basic issue: to
specify ways in which utterances have (or are perceived to have) meaning.
We might proceed by considering the suggestion that, in general, we talk
about situations; that human discourse is about the world; that the things
we say (i.e., our utterances) are about things (i.e., situations) that exist in
the physical world. A suggestion of this kind seems to be an argument for
recognition of a particular kind of relationship: one that is exempliﬁed by
an utterance and the situation that that utterance is about. We could call
this relationship “aboutness.” We could even call it “meaning” and propose
that my utterance (at 6 p.m. yesterday) of the words “I am standing in front
of my car” stands in a relationship of meaning with the situation in which
(at 6 p.m. yesterday) I was standing in front of my car. Just as we could say
that the utterance u is about the situation s, so we could say that u means s
or that s is the meaning of u. If we were to use the latter formulation, we
would need to be careful to note the distinction between the two different
senses of “meaning” we would already be using: (i) our name for a kind of
relationship between u and s and (ii) our name for a category in which, with
respect to u, s falls. Whenever we say that an utterance “has” meaning (or
semantic content, or indeed aboutness), we seem to be saying both that it
stands in a relationship of a certain kind with another entity of a certain
kind and that that other entity “is” its meaning (or content, or aboutness).
In the account just given, utterances mean situations. We might iden-
tify such an account as a referential theory of meaning, since there is a sense
in which, by this account, utterances are deemed to be meaningful in vir-
tue of their reference to situations. Moreover, it might seem possible to
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enrich such an account by suggesting both that the components of utter-
ances (e.g., subject terms and predicates) refer to the components of situ-
ations (e.g., objects and properties) and that it is in virtue of this reference
that the components of utterances are meaningful. Referential or compo-
sitional theories of meaning are commonly associated with correspondence
theories of truth, whereby an utterance is evaluated as true if it corresponds
with (i.e., refers to) “the facts”—in other words, if it corresponds with a sit-
uation that “obtains,” that is “actual,” that is “the case.”
Sentences
Linguists, lexicographers, information retrieval system designers, and
others interested in the use of words often need to be careful to distinguish
between word-tokens and word-types. In the previous sentence, for exam-
ple, the single word-type “to” is instantiated by two word-tokens or occur-
rences, as is the word-type “and.” Similarly, we should be careful to distin-
guish, in the current context, between utterance-tokens and utterance-types.
If I utter the words “I am standing in front of my car” at 6 p.m. on Monday,
and then again at 6 p.m. on Tuesday, a single utterance-type has been in-
stantiated by two utterance-tokens. To avoid confusion, we might reserve
the term “utterance” to stand for “utterancetoken,” and use another term
to stand for “utterance-type.” From now on, in this paper, I shall use “sen-
tence” instead of “utterance-type,” while fully recognizing that such usage
conﬂicts with the ordinary, everyday usage of “sentence.”7  Some examples
of sentences are listed in Table 1.
Two utterances of the same sentence can have different truth-values: for
example, my utterance on Monday might correspond with the facts, in which
case I would be telling the truth, whereas on Tuesday I might be lying. Two
utterances of the same sentence also can have different references. Suppose
I own two cars. My utterance on Monday might refer to the situation in which
I am standing in front of my Honda; my utterance of the same sentence on
Table 1. Some examples of sentences.
1
1101
1101 11 10101101
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I am standing in front of my car
Je me trouve devant ma voiture
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Tuesday might refer to the different situation in which I am standing in front
of my Toyota. Alternatively, the two utterances may have different references
simply because they are spoken by two different people.
We also might wish to consider that two different sentences can have
the same reference. If, at 6 p.m. yesterday, I utter the sentence “I am stand-
ing in front of my car,” and simultaneously my friend Hank utters the sen-
tence “Jonathan is standing in front of his car,” the two utterances are of
different sentences, but they share the same reference. Similarly, if I were
to utter the three sentences “I am standing in front of my car. I am posi-
tioned upright before my vehicle. Je me trouve devant ma voiture,” all three
would have the same reference.
But there is another general way in which two utterances of the same
sentence can have different meanings and in which two different sentences
can have the same meaning. Just as a single word-type can have different
meanings depending on the context in which it is used or instantiated as a
word-token, a single sentence can have different meanings depending on
the context in which it is uttered. For example, there seems to be a sense
in which the meaning of the utterance “I am standing in front of my car”
has a different meaning when spoken in response to the question “Are you
ready to go?” than when in response to the question “Where are you,” no
matter what is understood to be the physical reference of the utterance.
Many would argue that referential theories fail to give a comprehen-
sive account of meaning. One cause of failure (it is suggested) is the inability
of such theories to deal with utterances that seem to refer, if to anything at
all, to abstract concepts rather than to physical objects. Another problem
is the suggestion that, on many occasions, our intention in making an ut-
terance is not to refer to anything at all, but rather to have an effect of some
other kind on the world (hence, the common characterization of utterances
as speech acts). In these cases, our intuitive notion of “meaning” might lead
us to wish to commit to a sense in which utterances with nonreferential
functions have meaning. If the meaning of a sentence is not its referent (i.e.,
the situation that it represents or for which it stands), then what is it?
Thoughts
A common proposal in response to this kind of failure is to exploit the
idea of a third broad category of entities existing alongside linguistic enti-
ties and physical entities. This third category is one of mental entities—a
category of thoughts or ideas. In the same way that we can conceive of sit-
uations as comprising objects and properties, we might wish to treat an
individual thought as a composite of concepts of different kinds.
We would then have an alternative to the idea that, whenever we talk,
we refer to situations. This alternative is to say that, whenever we talk, we
express our thoughts; that we think about the world, and our talk repre-
sents our thoughts.8  The relationship of meaning that is now proposed is
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one between an utterance and a thought. The meaning—the semantic
content, the message—of an utterance is the thought that it expresses.
It might then appear to be a simple step to retain both ideas—that ut-
terances express thoughts and that utterances refer to situations—by con-
sidering the additional suggestion that thoughts themselves represent (or
perhaps “present”) situations in some way. In other words, the suggestion is
that linguistic entities represent mental entities, and any representation that
occurs of physical entities is carried out through the mediation of mental
entities. A typical composite account of this nature runs as follows: that there
exists a world of physical objects, among which are included people and
recorded utterances; that each individual person forms a mental image of
that physical world; that the content of each mental image is expressed or
“reﬂected” in the form of a person’s utterances, which are, in turn, consid-
ered by other minds in the formation of new mental images.
Propositions
In the philosophical literature, the term “thought” is sometimes replaced
in this context by the term “proposition.” The meaning of the utterance “I
am standing in front of my car” is the proposition that I am standing in front
of my car; in general, the meaning of utterance u is proposition p. Theories
of meaning that assume the existence of propositions might be referred to
as propositional theories, to distinguish them from referential theories.
We might consider, however, that it is additionally important to recog-
nize a distinction between the particular thought entertained by an indi-
vidual person—which is unique—and the class of thoughts of which that
particular thought is a member by virtue of its similarity to others within
that class (which others may or may not be entertained by the same per-
son). Just as we can distinguish between utterance-token and utterance-type,
we also may wish to distinguish between thought-token and thought-type,
speciﬁcally by substituting “proposition” for the latter category. And just as
we may characterize two utterances of the same sentence as sharing the
same form, we might characterize two thoughts of the same proposition as
sharing the same content.
So far, we have shied away from consideration of an obvious and cru-
cial issue for any theory of meaning, which derives from the essential com-
municative function of utterances. One of the primary reasons for our going
to the trouble of expressing our thoughts is our desire that others should
have access to those thoughts. Typically, our primary intention when mak-
ing an utterance is that our audience should interpret the utterance by
assigning to it the same meaning—the same proposition—as the one that
is instantiated by the thought we are expressing. Unfortunately, however,
our success in achieving this goal of perfect understanding never can be
guaranteed, primarily as a result of the underdetermination of the speak-
er meaning or hearer meaning of any utterance by its form.9  Whatever the
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proposition that is conventionally understood as the meaning of a given
sentence, it is possible for the speaker to intend that an utterance of that
sentence has a different meaning from the conventional one. Similarly,
whatever the proposition that an utterance is intended by its speaker to
express, it is possible for the hearer to interpret the utterance in a differ-
ent way, i.e., to understand the utterance as having a different meaning from
the intended one.
If only for analytical purposes, three separate components of the com-
munication process can be isolated at this point. One is expression, i.e., the
act of the speaker in producing an utterance, which involves making deci-
sions of the following kinds (inter alia): (i) a decision to select, from the stock
of thoughts making up the speaker’s mental state, a particular thought to
express at time t; (ii) a decision to select a particular set of utterances as the
language from which an utterance will be chosen; and (iii) a decision to se-
lect a particular utterance from that set. Another component is the establish-
ment of convention, i.e., the process by which speakers and hearers reach an
intersubjective consensus on the ordinary meanings of wordtypes and sen-
tences. The third component of the process is interpretation, i.e., the act of
the hearer in assigning meaning to a heard utterance. This act should be
recognized as one that is essentially creative, in that the hearer’s knowledge
of any meaning that is conventionally assigned to utterances of the given
sentence is only one (if a signiﬁcant one) of the factors that will inﬂuence
the assignation in any particular instance. Other contextual factors include
the extent and nature of the hearer’s prior knowledge, the nature of the
discourse of immediately prior utterances, the nature of the hearer’s inter-
pretation of that discourse, and so on. Interpretation is also creative in the
important sense that the meaning assigned to a heard utterance may be new;
the thought triggered by a heard utterance may be one that has not been
previously entertained by the hearer. Moreover, the response of the hearer
to a particular utterance may not be limited simply to an increase in the
quantity of thoughts making up her mental state; her attitude toward other
propositions may change. One thought has a habit of leading to another.
In principle, given a speaker, an utterance, a hearer, a discourse of prior
utterances, and a community of language users to which the speaker and
hearer belong, we may determine that the utterance simultaneously has
meanings of at least three different kinds: (i) its conventional meaning, i.e.,
the proposition conventionally attributed by the community to the sentence
instantiated by the utterance; (ii) its speaker meaning, i.e., the proposition
instantiated by the thought expressed by the speaker of the utterance; and
(iii) its hearer meaning, i.e., the proposition instantiated by the thought en-
tertained by the hearer on interpreting the utterance. These meanings may
or may not coincide. If (ii) is not the same as (i), then the likelihood of (iii)
being the same as (ii) will depend on the hearer’s success in making sense
of the discourse that provides the context for the utterance.
437furner/information studies without information
A Simple, General Ontology
The system of categories presented in Table 2 is provided both as a
summary of the foregoing discussion and as an example of the sort of tax-
onomy that is typically proposed in philosophy of language. Entities in the
“Token” categories are datable particulars; entities in the “Type” categories
are nondatable classes of particulars.
The distinctions between categories formalized in this system are one
possible result of our determining the necessity of differentiating among
entities of the following kinds:
1. particular physical states of affairs: e.g., the situation (at time t) in which
Hank is standing in front of his car;
2. general representations of individual states of affairs: e.g., the proposi-
tion that Hank is standing in front of his car;
3. particular internal instantiations of such representations: e.g., Lucy’s
thought (at time t) that Hank is standing in front of his car;
4. general external expressions of such representations: e.g., the English
sentence “Hank is standing in front of his car”
5. particular instantiations of such expressions: e.g., Lucy’s utterance (at
time t) “Hank is standing in front of his car”
A situation is a possible state of affairs in the physical world. At any giv-
en time t, only some situations “obtain” or are “the case” in actuality.
A proposition is an abstract, mental representation of a particular situa-
tion. There is a one-to-one correspondence between situations and propo-
sitions. Propositions may be evaluated in terms of their truth: a true prop-
osition is one that represents a situation that obtains.
A thought is a particular attitude toward a proposition in the mind of a
particular person. Different people can have thoughts about the same prop-
osition; a single person can have different thoughts about the same propo-
sition. Thoughts include beliefs; a belief is an acceptance of a given prop-
osition as true.
An utterance is a particular expression in symbolic form of a particular
thought. The same thought may be expressed by different utterances. Ut-
terances are what can be said to have meaning (i.e., to be meaningful); in
this sense, meaning (i.e., meaningfulness) is a property of utterances.
Whether an utterance is meaningful or not depends on the occurrence or
nonoccurrence of an event in which a human recognizes that utterance to
Table 2. Some entities commonly deﬁned in philosophy of language.
Linguistic Mental Physical
Tokens Utterances Thoughts Situations
Types Sentences Propositions
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express a particular thought. In this sense, strictly speaking, an utterance’s
meaningfulness is a property of the situation consisting not only of utter-
ance u, but also agent a and time t.
A sentence is the class of all utterances that share a particular symbolic
form. The same form can be used (by a single person or by different peo-
ple) to express different thoughts. The meaning of a sentence is a proposi-
tion p: we might say that the conventional meaning of the sentence “Hank
is fat” is the proposition that Hank is fat. Since we are free to interpret any
given sentence in any way we like, however, there is a many-to-many corre-
spondence between sentences and propositions. The same sentence can
represent different propositions; the same proposition can be represent-
ed by different sentences. In a strict sense, the particular proposition p that
is assigned at time t by agent a to a sentence s is a property of a situation—
is literally assigned as the outcome of a human act—and not something that
inheres in the sentence itself.
We might say that the form of an utterance is the sentence that it instan-
tiates, and the content of an utterance is the proposition that is instantiated
by the thought that the utterance expresses.
Conceptions of Information
We are now in a position to distinguish among three general kinds of
sense in which “information” has historically been used in the IS literature.
These three genera may be considered as the top level of a taxonomy of
concepts denoted by the term (Table 3). In the ﬁrst kind of sense, the con-
cept of information is understood to designate particulars (i.e., individual
objects or events) of certain types; in the second kind of sense, the desig-
nata are certain types of human action; and in the third kind of sense, the
designata are universals (i.e., properties) of certain types.
Information-as-Particular
Objects or events of the kinds that are designated by the concept of
information-as-particular are not necessarily “physical” or tangible. In this
particular context, the term “object” is used to refer both to linguistic enti-
ties (such as words) and to mental entities (such as concepts), as well as to
physical entities. The distinction between the linguistic, the mental, and the
Table 3. Conceptions of information
Information-as-particular Utterances
Thoughts
Situations
Information-as-action Communication
Information-as-universal Informativeness
Relevance
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physical serves as the basis for a division of the information-as-particular
category into three subcategories: the utterance as information; the thought
as information; and the situation as information.
The utterance as information
In this sense, corresponding roughly to Buckland’s category of “infor-
mation-as-thing,”10  the concept of information is understood to designate
symbols, signs, or signals,11 i.e., noises or marks (or even aromas or ﬂavors)
that are interpreted in some way by the hearer or viewer (or smeller or tast-
er). A generic term commonly used in many different contexts to denote
aggregations of such signals is “data.” Binary digits are data of one of the
simplest kinds; words, images, and sounds are also data. Data may be ag-
gregated in various forms and at various levels, as (to take the example of
textual data) alphabetic characters, words, sentences,12  paragraphs, chap-
ters, and books. Middle-range aggregations of data are typically considered
generically as documents (or “document-like objects”). In the sense present-
ed here, then, “utterance,” “data,” “signal,” and “document” are more or
less functionally equivalent.
The conception of the utterance as information may be considered as
an objectivist view, not simply by virtue of the physical existence of utter-
ances, but primarily by virtue of the supposedly objective nature of the cri-
teria to be used in determining whether something is classiﬁable as infor-
mation or not. In effect, this view commits one not only to the proposition
that information is anything that is interpretable—i.e., anything that is
capable of being interpreted—but also that the interpretability of an enti-
ty does not depend on its historically having been interpreted. Entities can
thus be classed as information on the basis of their potential to inform.
A distinction is often drawn between natural signs—the forms of phys-
ical objects such as clouds, tree stumps, smoke, tracks, and rocks—and
conventional signs. This distinction can serve not only to separate naturally
occurring signs from human artifacts, but also to highlight a supposed dif-
ference between the objective meaning of natural signs and the (at best)
intersubjective meaning of conventional signs. Once the decision is taken
to consider naturally occurring entities as interpretable, the way is clear for
a deﬁnition of information that encompasses “everything”—everything that
has the potential to be treated as a source of meaning, that is.
The thought as information
In this sense, corresponding to Buckland’s category of “information-
as-knowledge,” the concept of information is understood to designate
messages, i.e., the concepts or thoughts that are the product of a hearer’s
interpretation of signals. The distinction between signal and message is
explicitly drawn not only in the philosophy of language (where the distinc-
tion may be cast as one between utterance and thought, or between sen-
tence and proposition), but also, famously, in the mathematical theory of
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communication13  and in semiotics (where the contrast is between the
signiﬁer and the signiﬁed).
A metaphor in widespread illustrative usage is the distinction between
physical container and mental content: documents are regarded as the
(physical) expressions, representations, or records of conjunctions of (men-
tal) thoughts. Some authors, developing the metaphor further, have pro-
moted the view of documents as vehicles by which messages are transferred,
via a channel, conduit, or canal, across space and time. We should be care-
ful, however, not to infer from such an account of the communication pro-
cess that any given document has a single corresponding message—for
example, that intended by its author—the recovery of which is the aim of
any hearer; for it is clear both that any individual signal can be interpreted
in multiple ways and that any individual message can be expressed in mul-
tiple ways. The conduit metaphor seems to serve only to reify the contro-
versial idea that information is something that can somehow “ﬂow” from
one place to another. Such ﬂow would be possible only if messages were
inherent properties of signals, rather than separate entities assigned to sig-
nals by humans. These two different views of the nature of messages may
be characterized as, respectively, an objectivist and a subjectivist perspec-
tive on information.
Signals formed or recorded on media of certain kinds (e.g., paper, tape)
persist over time, with the result that they may be considered at a date lat-
er than that of their creation. The set of messages expressed by all signals
stored in this way is sometimes referred to as the world of recorded, pub-
lic, explicit, or objective knowledge, to contrast to the world of private, tacit,
or subjective knowledge. The sense in which “objective” and “knowledge”
are used in such formulations is sometimes ambiguous, however. If it is
actually the set of signals themselves (rather than the set of messages ex-
pressed by those signals) that is being referred to, then “objective” is ap-
propriate but “knowledge” is not; if instead the referent is the set of
thoughts or meanings that could potentially be assigned to those signals,
then “knowledge” (in the everyday sense) seems appropriate, but it might
be argued that “objective” is not, since such knowledge exists in people’s
minds—i.e., in the subjective realm of consciousness that is usually contrast-
ed with the physical world—not in signals.
A common strategy in IS is to deﬁne “information” in such a way as to
denote that class of messages that share a particular property, or (more
accurately) those that stand in a relationship of a particular kind to the
context in which their source signals are interpreted. A message might be
classiﬁed as information if it satisﬁes any (or any combination) of criteria
of the following kinds: (i) truth—i.e., its corresponding with the facts; (ii)
utility—its potentially being used to further the goals of the hearer; (iii)
novelty—its not having been assigned by the hearer to any previous signal;
(iv) unexpectedness—its coming as a surprise to the hearer; (v) uncertainty-
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reduction—its increasing the strength of the hearer’s current attitude to-
ward any proposition; and so on.14  Taken together, such criteria may be
considered as criteria for the relevance of a message to a hearer.
On this account, the effect of the signal that is the source of the mes-
sage is not simply to trigger some interpretative response on the part of the
hearer, but more speciﬁcally to cause a transformation of a particular kind
in the hearer’s mental state. It is the message that is information; the sig-
nal that serves as the source of the information is merely “informative,” or,
as philosophers of language might say, “meaningful.”15  All signals are at
least potentially informative; only some—those whose hearer meanings are
true and/or useful and/or novel, etc.—are actually so. Thus the determi-
nation of the informativeness of a signal at time t is a subjective matter, one
that relies on our determining the truth, utility, novelty, etc. of the mean-
ing assigned to it at time t by an individual hearer. This is roughly the posi-
tion of adherents to the inﬂuential “cognitive viewpoint” in IS.16
One reading of the cognitive view of information amounts to saying that
only some messages—those that fulﬁll the informative potential of signals—
are information. But we might decide that it is more useful to consider (i)
not only that all signals are potentially informative, but also that all mes-
sages are potentially relevant and (ii) that potential informativeness and
potential relevance are matters of degree. If we deﬁne information to en-
compass only actually relevant messages, then any decision as to whether
some entity is information or not becomes a wholly subjective matter (in
the sense that only individual hearers can determine the actual relevance
of messages), and the term “information” becomes of limited application.
On the other hand, if we deﬁne information to encompass all potentially
relevant messages, then the class denoted by “information” becomes the
same as that denoted by “message,” and the former term becomes redun-
dant. In any case, it would appear that determining the extent to which a
message is relevant to hearer a at time t is what is more important. I shall
return to this point in a moment.
The situation as information
In this sense, the concept of information is understood to designate
situations—i.e., states of affairs, arrangements of physical objects and prop-
erties, that may or may not obtain in actuality. Such a conception may be
considered as an extended version of the idea (discussed under “The ut-
terance as information,” above) that information is everything that is inter-
pretable; in the present case, even the requirement of interpretability be-
comes irrelevant since it is assumed that every possible entity is necessarily
interpretable. On this reading, the physical world is made up of data, or
(as is often said) of differences. Any entity, from the simplest to the most
complex, may be deﬁned by specifying the ways in which it may be distin-
guished from another; such a speciﬁcation is the substance of the entity;
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the entity is its own speciﬁcation. The distinction that, until now, we have
sustained between physical and linguistic entities is eradicated. For many,
the usefulness of assigning the label “information” to the class of all things
remains to be demonstrated.
Information-as-Action
The category of information-as-action corresponds roughly to Buck-
land’s “information-as-process,” encompassing conceptions of information
that apply the term to sequences of events that involve humans either as
agents (subjects) or as patients (objects) or both, and that may thus be treat-
ed as acts or actions.
Communication as information
It might be instructive at this point to contrast the common usages of
two words of similar morphology. We might talk about having received “a
communication” (i.e., a document), but more generally “communication”
is used to refer to the process of communicating, whereas “information” is
seldom used (in ordinary English language, at least) to refer to the processes
of informing or of becoming informed, of expressing thoughts or of inter-
preting utterances. Yet these latter are the technical senses that are meant
here. Instead of saying that documents are information, or that documents
contain information, we might wish to say that our very acts of creating,
classifying, storing, retrieving, and/or interpreting documents are informa-
tion. I would suggest, however, that we already have perfectly adequate la-
bels for those acts.
Information-as-Universal
The category of information-as-universal includes conceptions of infor-
mation that apply the term to certain attributes, or properties, of objects
or events. For example, the particular conception of information that is
associated with the mathematical theory of communication is one that
deﬁnes information as a measurable, quantitative property of signals. Thus
it makes sense to talk of the amount of information in a given signal.17
Informativeness as information
Given the everyday usage of “information” in reference to objects rather
than properties, it can be helpful, when thinking about information-as-prop-
erty, to substitute “informativeness” for the more common term, and to
consider the degree of informativeness (rather than the amount of infor-
mation) of signals.
Is there an analogy to be drawn between the informativeness of signals
and the meaningfulness of utterances? Given the sense in which meaning-
fulness was spoken of earlier, it might seem that to talk of the degree of
meaningfulness of a signal would be to stretch the notion inappropriately.
We might decide that it is more sensible to retain the idea that meaning-
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fulness is a binary property—that a signal is either meaningful or not. There
do seem to be other senses, however, in which we can comprehensibly as-
sess the value both of signals and of propositions.
One of these is the sense in which “information” is used in the mathe-
matical theory of communication. To evaluate the extent to which a signal
is informative, we need to determine the size of the set of signals from which
the given signal is selected; the larger this set, the greater the uncertainty
that a particular signal will be selected, and the more informative the ﬁnal
selection. Strictly speaking, then, informativeness is less an inherent prop-
erty of a signal per se, and more a property of the decision made to select
that signal from a particular set of alternatives.
Relevance as information
Decisions of this kind might well be construed as events rather than
objects. Once we realize that we are not necessarily restricted to signals when
identifying the kinds of entities that may “have information” to a greater
or lesser extent, other conceptions of information in the category of infor-
mation-as-property suggest themselves. For instance, we might wish to de-
velop a conception of the informativeness not merely of signals, but of mes-
sages, or even of situations. Such a conception might involve taking into
account not only the size of the set of entities from which the given entity
is selected, but also the history of previous such selection-events. In this way
we might arrive at conceptions of information that are essentially equiva-
lent to contemporary conceptions of relevance.
Some Concluding Remarks
We have now seen, through an analysis of the categories to which the
term “information” is variously applied in IS, how those categories are well-
understood in ﬁelds such as philosophy of language, communication stud-
ies, and semiotics, and how labels other than “information” have been used
to effectively distinguish among those categories in those ﬁelds. I would like
to conclude by suggesting that the treatment of the theory of meaning
adopted in this paper serves the purpose of highlighting the precise loca-
tion where any theory of information becomes truly interesting—and
where, incidentally, ﬁelds other than IS have made, and continue to make,
a greater deal of progress.
The point is that a good theory of meaning should do more than ex-
plain what it is to say that a signal is meaningful. It needs to explain how a
person assigns a particular meaning to a given signal; how one person de-
termines the meaning that has been assigned to a signal by another (in
other words, how communication takes place); how certain meanings come
to be conventionally associated with certain signals, and so on. However,
these seem to be less metaphysical questions than they are psychological—
questions, in other words, for the cognitive sciences, or (to the extent that
they involve philosophy at all) for the philosophy of mind.
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Now, if we wished to maintain one view of the nature of information
that is commonly assumed in the IS literature—that of the thought as in-
formation—then it would seem that these questions about the mechanics
of cognitive processes become crucially important for us to answer . . . or
at least for us to ﬁnd answers for in the literature of cognitive psychology.
(I am prompted to inquire what exactly it is that is achieved by attempting
to corral such weighty and long-standing questions under the rubric of “in-
formation studies” when they already attract wide interest from communi-
ties that, on the face of it, are rather better equipped to deal with the kinds
of issues that are raised by practical brain research.)
Alternatively, if we are more convinced of the usefulness of another
common conception of information—that of relevance as information—
then we should recognize, perhaps, that a good theory of information
should do more than simply explain what it is to say that a document’s
content is relevant. Ideally, it would explain how the extent to which a doc-
ument’s content is relevant (to agent a at time t) may accurately be predict-
ed. Of course, we have several such theories in IS, the most advanced be-
ing those that cluster in the area known as probabilistic information retrieval
(IR). Relevance research lies at the heart of probabilistic IR and of infor-
mation studies in general. Relevance researchers are also those IS people
who are most keenly aware of the signiﬁcance for IS of current work being
done in pragmatics and the philosophy of language.18  For those of us who,
while sharing a concern for the ways in which deﬁnitions of terms shape
perceptions, directions, and agendas, do not view ourselves as relevance
researchers per se, I suggest that it would be worthwhile to reﬂect on the
coherence, parsimony, and utility of a theory of information that, in its
essential conception of information-as-property, also happens to trace its
lineage back to Shannon’s original “information theory.”19
Notes
1. Recent reviews in information studies (IS) of the literature on the nature of information
include those by Capurro and Hjørland (2002), Case (2002), Cornelius (2002), and Dick
(2002).
2. Some might prefer the substitution of “symbolic” for “linguistic” in formulations of this
kind.
3. The division into three and the distinctive nature of the categories recall the Popperian
conception of worlds 1, 2, and 3. But Popper (1968) wished to emphasize the epistemic
qualities of worlds 2 and 3; each was conceived as a world of “knowledge” (subjective knowl-
edge in the case of world 2, and objective knowledge in the case of world 3). A closer anal-
ogy would be to any triadic model of the sign in semiotics: see, for example, Nöth (1990)
for a review of these models.
4. The explicit identiﬁcation of a category of physical entities in this model betrays a com-
mitment to realism about the external world, i.e., an assumption of the existence of a world
beyond our collected mental states that constrains those mental states in certain ways.
5. There are many good introductions to the main issues in philosophy of language; a re-
cent example is by Lycan (2000). Blair (2002) provides an overview of the applications of
philosophy of language to the study of information retrieval.
6. Another account might privilege events rather than objects but treat events similarly as
property-bearing entities occurring in relation to one another.
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7. Other technical deﬁnitions of “sentence” are also variously suggested in the philosophi-
cal literature.
8. We might say that such a proposal asks us to commit to the ontological priority of the
physical world over thought, and thought over language.
9. It is intended that the term “speaker” denotes any human source of an utterance, in spo-
ken or written form; similarly, “hearer” denotes any human interpreter of an utterance.
10. See Buckland (1991).
11. Semioticians are usually careful to distinguish the senses of these three words. The con-
cept of “sign” is commonly modeled as a dyad of word and object (e.g., signiﬁer and
signiﬁed) or as a triad (e.g., sign vehicle, signiﬁcatum, and denotatum). It is important to
note that the intention at this point in the present paper is to use “signal” and “utterance”
interchangeably, to denote signiﬁer-tokens.
12. “Sentence” is used here in the everyday sense of the term.
13. See Shannon and Weaver (1949).
14. See, for example, Machlup (1983).
15. Cognitivists might even prefer “transformative.”
16. See, for example, Belkin (1990).
17. It should be noted that this conception of amount of information is quite different from
the notion of quantity that is assumed, for example, in studies that seek to determine how
much information there is to be found in the world. In studies of that kind, it is the quan-
tity of data (numbers of documents or numbers of bytes) that is measured.
18. In his paper summarizing the signiﬁcance for IS of the theory of psychological relevance
developed by the pragmaticists Sperber and Wilson (1986), Harter (1992) suggests that
“[r]elevance and information-as-process are intimately related; we may not need both ideas
(or terms) in information science. Moreover employing two terms may be detrimental to
the development of theory, since it suggests that information and relevance are different,
when perhaps they can usefully be regarded as one and the same.”
19. The implications for IS of the particular vision of information-as-property developed by
Dretske (1981) have perhaps not yet been fully recognized; see van Rijsbergen and Lal-
mas (1996) and Bonnevie (2001) for interpretations from different perspectives.
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